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In the past five years, distributed operating systems re- 
search has gone through a consolidation phase. On a large 
number of design issues there is now considerable consensus 
between different research groups. 
In this paper, an overview cf recent research in distributed 
systems is given. In turn, the paper discusses overall system 
structure, protection issues, file system designs, problems and 
solutions for fault tolerance and a mechanism that is rapidly 
becoming very important for efficient distributed systems de- 
sign: hints. 
An attempt was made to provide sufficient references to 
interesting research projects for the reader to find material for 
more detailed study. 
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1. Introduction 
Advances in micro-electronic technology have 
caused a minor revolution in system architecture. 
Processors and are now so cheap and small that it 
has become practical to bui ld computer systems 
out of many processing elements. Sometimes this 
is done by having several processors hare a com- 
mon theory, and sometimes it is done by giving 
each processor a private memory and providing 
communicat ion facilities through a network. 
If there are two different programs to be run, 
two processors are evidently more powerful than 
one: The work can be divided. But this is not so 
evident if there is only one program to be run. It is 
then much harder to put the available paral lel ism 
to use. Tradit ional  system design methods and 
software engineering principles do not provide 
adequate methods of splitt ing up algorithms in 
independent parts which can be executed in paral-  
lel. Building distr ibuted systems is easy. Using 
them is hard. 
Potential ly, systems built up of many processors 
are more rel iable than tradit ional  computers with 
a single CPU. If the processor fails, the system 
comes to a halt. In a distr ibuted system, this is no 
longer necessary. Every single component of the 
system could be replicated, so that, no matter  
what component  fails, a subsystem is left behind 
that can be made to work. If one processing 
element fails, others can take over the work. If a 
disk fails, a copy of the information could still be 
available on another disk. 
As it turns out, designing software that exploits 
this fault-tolerant property of such a configuration 
is surprisingly difficult. Standard techniques for 
sof tware development are all based on the as- 
sumption that the underlying hardware is infall i- 
ble. This is a perfectly proper assumption in tradi-  
t ional systems, where, if part  of the system fails, 
the whole system stops working, but  it is no longer 
true in a distr ibuted system. 
Distr ibuted systems research concentrates on 
the problem of structuring the hardware and de- 
signing the operat ing system software in such a 
way that we can profit  by the architecture's two 
most important  potentials, paral lel ism and fault 
tolerance. 
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Distributed systems research shows that there 
are many ways in which the problems can be 
attacked. Some systems are structured through 
their communication primitives, others through 
their language constructs, and others again through 
the underlying operating system. In this paper, we 
shall describe some recent work in distributed 
operating systems, concentrating on significant and 
unusual approaches. We shall look at system 
structure, protection, mechanisms for fault toler- 
ance, and file systems. The last section will de- 
scribe some of the significant rends in distributed 
systems work. 
2. Sys tem Structure 
Distributed systems have evolved from batch 
systems and time-shared systems, and, therefore, 
early distributed systems till had the data-stream 
model firmly in their communication systems. In- 
terprocess communication was designed to resem- 
ble reading or writing magnetic tapes: First a 
virtual circuit was opened, then one wrote (or 
read) data for some time, and when the end was 
reached, the circuit was closed again. 
This model was quite efficient, actually, when 
networks were still slow compared with processors: 
The explicit set-up of a virtual circuit allows the 
communicating parties to negotiate the allocation 
of buffer space to guarantee a certain throughput, 
and to streamline communication by allowing 
several packets of data to be en route at any time. 
In modern fast local-area networks, with com- 
munication bandwidths of 10 Megabits per sec- 
ond, or more, such techniques no longer work. 
They actually tend to slow down communication. 
The extra processor cycles needed for optimizing 
network bandwidth by streamlining communica- 
tion consume more time than is gained. 
Protocols for use in distributed systems must be 
optimized for speed more than for anything else. 
Where conventional systems read files form the 
local file systems, distributed systems will often 
have to fetch files from a separate file server. 
Where in conventional systems all processing is 
local, in distributed systems processes may run on 
different processors for additional speed; their 
communication should not slow things down again. 
The user is seldom prepared to pay for additional 
flexibility by degraded performance. 
Many successful distributed systems use the 
message transaction model: One process, the 
client, sends a request to another process, the 
server [1]. The server carries out the request and 
returns a reply. Different systems use different 
message lengths; some have fixed-size messages, 
others have variable-size messages, but in most of 
these models there is this request/reply pair in 
one form or another. 
The message-transaction model is simple to im- 
plement and it can be made extremely fast.* But 
it is also easy to understand. There is a much 
better synchronisation between the actions of a 
program (e.g., send request) and the actions of the 
communication mechanisms (e.g., sending a mes- 
sage) than there is in a byte-stream-oriented pro- 
tocol. In a byte-stream protocol, the actions of the 
program (e.g., send k bytes) are not synchronized 
with the actions of the communication primitives 
(e.g., send an n-byte packet). Explicit synchroniza- 
tion primitives have to be provided such as an 
end-of-message character, or a flush command. 
Far more important than this difference be- 
tween message transactions and byte streams is 
the difference between the two in failure semantics 
- the difference in what happens when a crash 
occurs in the system, or when an intermediate 
node goes down. In the connection-oriented model 
of the world, the communication primitives dis- 
tinguish between a crash in the communication 
system and a crash in the end system. End-system 
crashes are no business of the communication 
mechanisms. Report of delivery of a message to a 
remote process is semantically meaningless, be- 
cause the process may crash before it has had time 
to look at it. 
The failure semantics of message transactions 
are much better: In the normal case (i.e. no 
crashes), the client receives a reply from the server. 
To the client this is a true end-to-end acknowl- 
edgement, because reception of the reply not only 
indicates successful reception of a request mes- 
sage, but also successful processing of the request. 
* Our own system, the Amoeba Distributed System, obtains a
user proces to user process continuous throughput of 500000 
bytes/second, using full 32Kbyte messages and a minimum 
transaction response time of 10 ms. We do not know any 
distributed system using virtual circuits that achieves more 
than one third of this speed using off-the-shelf network 
interfaces as we do. 
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In case of a failure (i.e. no reply is received), the 
client cannot tell what went wrong: the request 
may have been lost, the server may have crashed, 
or the reply might have gone awry. No protocol 
exists that guarantees to find out which possibility 
occurred; there are always scenarios where the 
protocol doesn't know or reports wrong, so there 
is no point in attempting it. 
Sometimes the point is made that acknowledge- 
ments that are not end-to-end increase the ef- 
ficiency of the protocols. This may be true in 
unreliable and slow wide-area networks, but in 
fast local networks, communication errors are so 
rare that the overhead of the extra mechanisms 
may well decrease the average efficiency of the 
protocols. 
Early distributed systems often had asynch- 
ronous communication primitives. Asynchronous 
primitives have separate calls for initiating com- 
munication and for waiting until that communica- 
tion completes. There would, for instance, be a call 
receive which takes a message buffer as parameter, 
which would tell the kernel " I f  a message arrives, 
put it there; meanwhile, I'll continue doing some 
work," and a separate call, wait or status, which 
would be used to wait for the reception to com- 
plete or enquire whether it had completed already. 
The philosophy behind these asynchronous calls 
was that they provide a mechanism for parallel 
processing, but experience has shown that it was 
not always practical. 
Asynchronous calls cause more operating sys- 
tem overhead, because of the extra user/kernel 
interactions (at least one for initiating the call and 
one for waiting), but they also make things very 
complicated for the programmer. This is especially 
noticeable in the code for servers that serve several 
clients simultaneously. To exploit the parallelism 
offered by asynchronous calls, the code often ends 
up as a finite-state machine: at the top of loop the 
program waits for an event, finds out the task the 
event belongs to and executes a case statement on 
the state of that task and the event. Needless to 
say this hardly produces clear and modular code. 
It is because of the inefficiency of asynchronous 
calls and the difficulty of using them that distrib- 
uted system are now usually equipped with syn- 
chronous communication primitives. Naturally, it 
is no longer possible to obtain parallelism out of 
the communication mechanisms, o another mech- 
anism is needed to obtain it. 
This mechanism often consists of implementing 
parallel processes, in such a way that it is possible 
to have very many of them and that process 
switching and scheduling is cheap. In order to do 
parallel processing, one thus creates many of these 
light-weight processes which can then do blocking 
message transactions with remote processes. 
Usually, groups of light-weight processes hare 
one address pace. Such a group is then called a 
team (V-System [2]), or a cluster (Amoeba [3]). 
This makes the implementation of services quite 
straightforward: All data structures - such as file 
tables and block caches for a file server - can be 
shared in the common address space, while each 
process can serve one request at a time. By creat- 
ing enough light-weight server processes to start 
with, any amount of parallel processing can be 
obtained. The one remaining snag is that there can 
be race conditions when two fight-weight processes 
concurrently access a common data structure. This 
problem can be overcome, however, by introduc- 
ing condition variables, monitors or semaphores, or 
by scheduling processes only on blocking com- 
munication system calls. 
3. Protection 
Two approaches to protection are common in 
distributed systems research: In one, the system is 
treated as a closed system, with a trusted operat- 
ing system kernel in each machine. All communi- 
cation passes through the kernel, the kernel pro- 
vides authenticating information and checks per- 
missions, and the kernels trust each other. This 
model is based on the traditional operating system 
concept, it is simple, and is quite practical in 
many environments. 
In the other model, a basic assumption is that 
workstations cannot trust the information from 
another workstation without making sure (usually 
by means of encryption) that the authenticating 
information has not been tampered with. The 
reason for this lack of trust if that it is often all 
too easy to re-boot a workstation with another, 
untrusted, version of the operating system to evade 
any protection mechanisms that reside there. 
In the first model, it is, of course, necessary to 
assume that the operating system cannot be 
tampered with and that no process can avoid the 
protection mechanisms. Furthermore, the com- 
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munication channel between kernels must be 
secure against passive or active intruders (wire 
tappers). This can usually be guaranteed by using 
encryption on the channel between two kernels. 
The whole model is well-understood and easy to 
realise, assuming a secure kernal can be built and 
workstations cannot be secretly re-booted.* 
The second model is much more interesting 
from a research point of view, and probably more 
realistic as well. A process can only distinguish 
itself from another one by using some secret that 
other processes do not have; using this secret, 
messages can be generated or understood that 
other processes cannot generate or understand. An 
example of such a secret in traditional operating 
systems in the log-in password, or - as present in 
some systems - a file password. In distributed 
systems, typical secrets are encryption keys or ca- 
pabilities. 
Conceptually, the effect of a protection mecha- 
nism can be modelled by a matrix, M, indexed by 
user and object (or resource). The operations 
allowed by user i on object j are given in Mij. 
This conceptual model is usually implemented in 
one of two ways. The first is to store with each 
object a list of users' fights to the object; that is, 
to keep the object's column of M with the object. 
This list is referred to as an access control list or 
ACL. The other is to give each user a list of all 
objects with the user's rights on them; that is, to 
give each user the corresponding row of M. This 
list is referred to as a capability list. 
When ACLs are used, servers that manage ob- 
jects and control the access to them must have 
some way of establishing the client's identity. Sim- 
ilarly, clients must have a way of making sure that 
requests to do operations on objects are fielded by 
a genuine server and not by some imposter. An 
authentication mechanism is needed to determine 
the identity of the client to the server and of the 
server to the client. When capabilities are used, 
clients still need to have a way of ascertaining the 
authencity of the server, but the server need not 
know the identity of the client - it is enough that 
the client can produce a capability for the object. 
* This assumption makes it almost mandatory that the work- 
stations must be in a computer room or terminal room, 
where they can be physically supervised, or that he bootstrap 
ROMs are modified to refuse to bootstrap from a user-sup- 
plied binary. 
Instead, a mechanism is needed that prevents 
clients from forging capabilities. A mechanism for 
this can be easily be constructed: A server can 
build one by concatenating a server identifier, an 
object number, a bit map indicating the rights and 
a check field. The check field can be computed 
using some function which takes the three other 
fields plus a random number - stored along with 
the object - as input, scrambles the bits throughly, 
and produces the check field. The random number 
is kept as a secret within the server, so only the 
server can compute capabilities. 
Authenticating clients and servers can be done 
with the help of an authentication server. It must 
be trusted by the clients and servers that use it, 
and provides encryption keys for the communica- 
tion between a specific client/server pair. Public- 
key encryption would be even better, because it 
provides a mechanism where only one key pair is 
needed for every client or server. With n clients 
and servers, n 2 conventional keys are needed, 
while only 2n keys are needed when public-key 
encryption is used. Unfortunately, public keys are 
very large (a few hundred bits at least), encryption 
is slow, and therefore not practical. 
A few systems rely on a different concept of 
protection. Two interesting examples are the ITC 
system at CMU [4] and the Amoeba system at 
CWI in Amsterdam [3]. The ITC distributed sys- 
tem consists of hundreds of workstations at which 
students do their programming assignments. In 
addition to those workstations, a number of dedi- 
cated servers give students access to a large shared 
file system, printing services, etc. The protection 
concept is that the central services can be kept 
under lock and key in the computer oom so they 
can be trusted, while the student workstations are 
out in terminal rooms and in private offices, so 
they can be tampered with. The trusted environ- 
ment (the servers) is called Vice and the untrusted 
environment (the workstations) is called Virtue. 
Nearly all communication takes place between 
Vice and Virtue and Vice servers also act as 
authentication servers. 
The unconventional protection mechanism of 
the Amoeba system [5] is also based on the notion 
that the operating system of workstations in private 
offices or terminal rooms can easily be tampered 
with, but also on the notion that encryption of all 
data for protection might slow down the system 
too much (there was no room for encryption 
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hardware in the budget). The assumption was 
made, however, that in student environments, 
tampering with the hardware is an order of magni- 
tude less likely than meddling with operating sys- 
tem software. The Amoeba protection mechanism 
is based conceptually on a simple device, inserted 
between each workstation and the network, which 
filters incoming and outgoing messages. Com- 
munication is based on ports: A process sends a 
message to a port and another receives it on a 
port. Each port has two names, one for sending to 
it, and one for receiving on it. The little interface 
box matches port names and only lets messages 
through if the receive port has been given to it by 
the potential recipient. Names of ports are essen- 
tially large random bit patterns, large enough so 
they can't be forged. By keeping its receive port 
secret and publishing its send port, a server can go 
into business without fear of being impersonated 
by a malicious client. 
4. File Systems 
A reliable file system is an important aspect of 
fault tolerance and much research as been done 
in the area of building file systems with things like 
replicated storage, concurrency control mecha- 
nisms, local caches of remote data, version con- 
trol, etc. [6]. 
There is no general consensus on what a file 
system should do exactly as this depends very 
much on the environment in which it is used. 
Interesting new types of file servers are the ones 
that do whole-file transfer [7,8]. Files are always 
read and written as a whole. This type of file 
server is very efficient in environments with rea- 
sonably small files and with low concurrency and 
is used in universities for storage of student files. 
Another type of file server that is seen more 
and more is one where files have versions [9]. A 
version of a file, after it has been made, becomes 
immutable, and changes to the file are represented 
by a sequence of versions, each new one based on 
the previous one. This type of file server works 
well on optical disks, which can only be written 
once. As an optimization, often only the dif- 
ferences between a version and the previous one 
are actually stored. 
Some file systems have an elaborate file naming 
mechanism, where files can be named in a 
hierarchical naming tree or graph. Other file sys- 
tems only implement unique identifiers for naming 
files or versions [10]. Another service (directory 
service, say) can implement any naming mecha- 
nism on top. The latter method gives the flexi- 
bihty to implement several naming structures on 
top of a single file system. 
One general trend in file system research is 
observable: There is considerable interest in cach- 
ing. File caches are necessary for making file 
systems efficient, but they are very much in the 
way of concurrency control mechanisms. The ver- 
sion-type file systems appears to do best in com- 
bining the two. 
5. Fault Tolerance 
For a large part, fault tolerance is what distrib- 
uted systems research is about. Having two or 
more copies of everything makes it possible, at 
least in principle, to continue operations when 
failures occur. The biggest problem is to discover 
failures and to recover from them. 
Failures come in categories. The worst failures 
are often referred to as Byzantine failures,* failures 
where parts of the system behave incorrectly and 
sometimes even maliciously so. The file server, for 
instance, could lie about the contents of a file. 
Algorithms that work correctly in environments 
with Byzantine failures are Byzantine algorithms; 
they are very robust but usually very inefficient as 
well. 
Most distributed systems are based on the as- 
sumption that processes exhibit so-called fail-stop 
behaviour. When a process fails, it stops; that is, 
processes work normally, or not at all. Under this 
assumption, it is much easier to construct al- 
gorithms that continue to work when a limited 
number of processes fail. 
In addition to fail-stop behaviour, it is useful to 
be able to group the actions of a process in such a 
way that whole groups of actions get done cor- 
rectly until a failure occurs and that the last group 
of actions is either completely and correctly done, 
* Names after the problem of the Byzantine generals [11]: n 
generals, of which k generals may cheat, must make a 
binary decision. Design a protocol that makes uch a deci- 
sion in a way that all generals know the correct outcome in 
spite of the efforts of the cheating enerals. 
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done, or none of the actions in the last group is 
done. Such a group is an atomic action. Either all 
of an atomic action succeeds correctly, or none of 
it; there is no middle way, no half-done atomic 
actions. 
A (virtual) disk, whose blocks can be read and 
written atomically, is referred to as stable storage. 
It is implemented with two identical disks, and the 
implementation is based on the principle that 
disks have a weak atomic property [12]. When a 
block is written, and the writing hardware or 
software fails, the block is in one of three states: 
- the actual writing had not started yet and the 
disk is still unmodified; 
- the actual writing had already finished and the 
write completed correctly; 
- or it was broken off half way, but the disk is in 
a detectably bad state, the hardware CRC check- 
sum is in error and this is detected when it is next 
read. 
Whenever a block is written, it is first written 
on one disk, and only after the write has finished 
correctly it is written to the other disk. If a failure 
occurs, at least one of the disks is always in a 
correct state (a before or an after state), and the 
stable storage system can recover when it comes 
up again. If the crash occurs exactly between the 
two writes, both disks are readable but different. 
When the system comes up, one copy can be 
chosen and written over the other. 
Using, for instance, stable storage to implement 
atomic I /O  for disk blocks, atomic I /O  for multi- 
ple blocks can be implemented. Using that, it is 
possible to build arbitrary atomic actions by pre- 
tending to carry out the actions and to store the 
results (modifications of the system) on an'inten- 
tions list. When the atomic action ends, the mod- 
ifications are first flagged permanent (by atomi- 
cally changing one bit), and then introduced into 
the system by executing the intentions. The inten- 
tions list is structured so it can be executed partly 
any number of times and once correctly. 
Atomic actions can be further structured by 
allowing nested atomic actions [13,14]. Concurrent 
atomic actions are hard to implement, especially if
one wants as much concurrency as possible. 
Mechanisms to implement concurrent atomic usu- 
ally use locking [15], and sometimes optimistic 
concurrency control [16,17]. 
6.  H in ts  
A notion that has emerged in distributed sys- 
tems research that is important enough to deserve 
a separate section is the hint. The idea of using 
hints came from Butler Lampson [18] who used it 
in the file server of the Alto operating system. 
Since then, it has become a very popular mecha- 
nism to speed up distributed operations that might 
otherwise be too slow for comfort. 
In [19] Lampson describes a hint as the "saved 
result from a previous computation." Hints are 
very much like cache entries, but there is one 
essential difference: Hints may be wrong. This 
makes hints no less worth while as a mechanism, 
provided there is a backup mechanism that will 
prevent harm from using a faulty hint and correct 
the hint. 
The idea is best illustrated by an example. A 
send port in the Amoeba system looks like a 
random bit pattern. It provides no clue about the 
whereabouts of the receiving process. To make it 
even more difficult, there can be several processes 
receiving on a single receiver port, and the system 
is allowed to deliver a message to any one of them. 
Furthermore, processes are mobile, processes can 
crash and new processes can be created. However, 
in practice, the location of most processes does 
not change very much. A sender process, there- 
fore, keeps hints consisting of send ports and 
network addresses. When a process sends to a 
send port and there is a hint for that send port, 
the system sends the message to the indicated 
network address. But every once in a while, the 
receiving process has migrated, or crashed, and is 
no longer there. In Amoeba, the backup mecha- 
nism consists of a message sent by the network 
interface of the wrong recipient back to the sender, 
saying "unknown at this address." The system 
then finds the correct location using a broadcast 
mechanism (or a distributed name server in the 
wide-area network). 
Hints can be used in many cases. Hints are 
used in file systems to find the next block of a file 
without having to consult an index on disk, saving 
a disk access (if the file changes, the hint becomes 
incorrect; the backup mechanism is often the 
header of the next block). They are used in the 
routing tables of store-and-forward networks. The 
absence of a token for some period is a hint that 
the token was lost in token-ring network (it is a 
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more hint, because another station may just have 
generated a new one). 
Hints have become important in distributed 
systems, where changes to the system state 
(whatever that is) are not immediately visible ev- 
erywhere. It is extremely handy to be able to 
assume that something remote is in a particular 
state (it usually is) and that an operation will 
succeed if the assumption is right, but that some 
backup mechanism will come into operation if it is 
not. 
7. Summary 
Successful distributed systems are all simple 
systems. The interprocess communication mecha- 
nism is always simple and fast. Remote procedure 
call is used, or message transactions. Processes are 
usually light-weight, and communication calls are 
blocking. When a server crashes, the client process 
is usually responsible for recovery (usually by 
repeating the action on another server). 
Protection is treated seriously enough as a re- 
search issue, but it is seldom put rigorously into 
practice. Only in student environments i some 
effort often necessary to make the system secure, 
but the Cambridge Distributed System, for in- 
stance, which has a perfectly secure concept of 
protection does not really use it; the system ad- 
ministrators rely on the good manners of the 
Cambridge student. Which works. 
File systems are tailored for the environment in
which the system is used. In environments popu- 
lated primarily by students, file systems typically 
offer whole-file transfer for efficiency and simplic- 
ity. Few, if any concurrency control mechanisms 
are offered, because changing files are not often 
shared. In environments with much concurrency, 
one would expect very sophisticated file systems, 
but this seems to be only rarely the case. Actually, 
not many distributed systems are in operation in 
demanding environments in the first place. Usu- 
ally, distributed file systems offer files as a linear 
sequence of bytes and locking for concurrency 
control. 
Atomic actions are an important tool for imple- 
menting fault tolerance. Structuring fault-tolerant 
systems, or better still, structuring fault-tolerant 
systems in such a way that they are easy to use, 
will need more research. Interesting work is going 
on at CorneU, where the ISIS system is being 
developed [20]. It executes ordinary programs in a 
fault-tolerant way. 
Albert Einstein is reported to have said "Every- 
thing should be as simple as possible, but no 
simpler." This certainly applies to system design, 
and, if possible, even more to distributed system 
design. All too often, systems are made too com- 
plicated and become inefficient and impractical 
because of their complexity. Almost everything 
designed by a committee has this property: X.25, 
Ada, TSO, to name a few. A distributed system is 
inherently faster than a centralized one: parallel 
processing can be exploited; but a distributed 
system is also ihherently slower: files that used to 
be always on a local disk, are now often stored in 
the (remote) file server. Communication overhead 
creeps in everywhere. If the distributed system 
must be used, it must be at least as good as the old 
centralized system. The single most important way 
to achieving this is to make communication asfast 
as possible. And this can only be done by making 
the communication i terface as simple as possible. 
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